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Summary
This thesis focuses on atomless games in game theory.
In Chapter 1, we review the development of game theory in history and introduce
the main results of this paper. Chapter 2 consists of the mathematical preliminaries
needed in this thesis. Then, in Chapter 3, we introduce some basic elements of
game theory, and provide the classical proof of the existence of Nash equilibrium
in mixed-strategies. Also atomless games are introduced.
The new results of this thesis are included in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, in which
we discuss certain atomless games in details. Chapter 4 deals with games with
private information. Based on our mathematical results on the set of distributions
induced by the measurable selections of a correspondence with a countable range,
we provide the purification results and also prove the existence of a pure strategy




Chapter 5 focuses on large games. We show the existence of equilibrium for
a game with continuum of players with finitely many types, and with countable
actions, where a player’s payoff depends on the action distributions of all the
players with the same type. We also consider another kind of large games with a
continuum of small players and a compact action space, where the players’ payoffs
depend on their own actions and the mean of the transformed strategy profiles.
Part of the results in Chapter 5 has been written into a journal paper [41] with Zhu
Wei, which is to be published in an international journal – “Economic Theory”.
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 History of Game Theory
Game theory is the study of multi-person decision problems. Generally, it can be
divided into two kinds: cooperative games and non-cooperative games. The usual
distinction between these two theories of game is whether there is some binding
agreement. If yes, the game is cooperative; Otherwise, non-cooperative. The
Nobel Prize of Economic Sciences in 1994 was awarded to three experts of game
theory: Nash, Selten and Harsanyi. Their main contributions to game theory are
the insightful studies in non-cooperative game. This paper also focuses on non-
cooperative games.
Historically speaking, the study of game theory began with the publication of The
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior by Von Neumann and Morgenstern in
1944. The 1950s was a period filled with excitement in game theory. During that
time, cooperative game had developed some crucial concepts, for instance, bar-
gaining models by Nash [24], core in cooperative games by Gillies [13] and Shapley
[36], Shapley value by Shapley [37], etc. Around the same period when coopera-
tive game research peaked in 1950s, non-cooperative game began to develop. For
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example, Tucker [40] defined prisoner’s dilemma; Nash published two of his most
important papers of non-cooperative games – [25] in 1950 and [26] in 1951. Their
works laid the foundation for non-cooperative game theory. The sixties and sev-
enties in last century were decades of growth in game theory. Extensions such
as games of incomplete information (see, for example, Harsanyi [14], [15], [16]),
the concept of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (see, for example, Selten [34],
[35]), etc. made the theory more widely applicable. Since 1980s, the concepts
and models have become more specified and formulated. For example, Kreps,
Milgrom, Roberts and Wilson [20] on incomplete information in repeated games,
Radner and Rosenthal [27] on private information and existence of pure -strategy
equilibria, Milgrom and Weber [23] on distributional strategies for games with in-
complete information, Khan and Sun [18] on pure strategies in games with private
information with countable compact action space.
Most models of game theory in economics were developed after 1970s. Since 1980s
in last century, game theory has gradually become one part of mainstream eco-
nomics, even forming the basis of micro-economics. Here, I would like to quote the
words in Games and Information by Eric Rasmusen [28] to sum up the position of
game theory in economics. He said:
Not so long ago, the scoffer could say the econometrics and game theory were like
Japan and Argentina. In the late 1940s both disciplines and both economies were
full of promise, poised for rapid growth and ready to make a profound impact on the
world. We all know what happened to the economies of Japan and Argentina. Of
the disciplines, econometrics became an inseparable part of economics, while game
theory languished as a subdiscipline, interesting to its specialists but ignored by the
profession as a whole. The specialists in game theory were generally mathemati-
cians, who cared about definitions and proofs rather than applying the methods to
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economics problems. Game theorists took pride in the diversity of disciplines to
which their theory could be applied, but in none had it become indispensable.
In the 1970s, the analogy with Argentina broke down. At the same time the Ar-
gentina was inviting back Juan Peron, economists were beginning to discover what
they could achieve by combining game theory with the structure of complex eco-
nomic situations. Innovation in theory and application was especially useful for
situations with asymmetric information and a temporal sequence of actions,· · · .
During the 1980s, game theory became dramatically more important to mainstream
economics. Indeed, it seemed to be swallowing up microeconomics just as econo-
metrics had swallowed up empirical economics.
1.2 Main Results
The main purpose of my thesis work is to focus on some aspects in the recent
development of game theory. The main contents include two parts–one deals with
game with private information and countable action spaces, and the other focuses
on large games.
Chapter 4 deals with games with private information. It is based on an article
[18] by Khan and Sun. We show that in the game with diffuse and independent
private information, purification of mixed-strategy equilibrium as well as pure-
strategy equilibrium exists when the action spaces are countable but not neces-
sarily compact. To prove the results, we also develop the distribution theory of
correspondences taking values in a countable complete metric space.
Radner and Rosenthal pointed out in [27] that randomized strategies have limited
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appeal in many practical situations, and thus it is important to ask under what
general conditions, pure strategy equilibrium exists. They showed both the purifi-
cation of mixed-strategy equilibrium and the existence of pure strategy equilibrium
for a game with finitely many players, finite action spaces, and diffuse and inde-
pendent private information. However, as shown by an example in Khan, Rath
and Sun [17] that there exists a two-player game with diffuse and independent
private information and with the interval [−1, 1] as their action space that has
no equilibrium in pure strategies. This means that the result of the existence of
pure strategy equilibrium of Radner and Rosenthal cannot be extended to general
action spaces.
On the other hand, it has been shown in Khan and Sun [18] that the purification of
mixed-strategy equilibriums together with a pure strategy equilibrium does exist in
a finite game with diffuse and independent private information and with countable
compact metric spaces as their action spaces. However, the requirement of com-
pactness for a countable action space excludes some interesting cases, including
the most commonly used countable space, the space of natural numbers.
It was suggested in the section of concluding remarks in [18] that one can work with
compact-valued correspondences taking values in countable metric action spaces
and tie in with the setting studied in Meister [22] to generalize Theorem 3 in [18]
to the case of general countable metric action spaces. However, we notice that the
proof of Theorem 2.1 in [22] has some problems.1 This also motivates us to consider
how the compactness assumption on the action spaces in Theorem 3 of [18] can be
relaxed. As we look into the problem more carefully, we realize that it may not be
1Meister [22] applied Theorem 3.1 (DWW theorem) in Dvoretzky et al [10] incorrectly. The
DWW theorem was used to purify a mixed-strategy whose values are probability measures with
finite supports that may change with respect to the sample information points and are not
contained in a common finite set. The latter condition, however, is a crucial condition in the
DWW theorem.
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so obvious to generalize Theorem 3 of [18] to the case of general countable metric
action spaces. In fact, we need to work with countable complete metric action
spaces (which clearly include the space of natural numbers) to show the existence
of pure strategy equilibrium. With such settings, we also show the purification
results. Without the completeness assumption or other related assumptions, we
do not know whether the result still holds.
In Chapter 5, we work with large games. After introducing a simple large game
model developed by Rath[29], we show the existence of equilibrium for a game
with continuum of players with finitely many types, and with countable actions,
where a player’s payoff depends on the action distributions of all the players with
the same type in Section 5.2.
The similar result with finite action spaces has been studied in Radner and Rosen-
thal [27], and that with countable metric action space has been shown in Khan and
Sun [18]. However, as we mention above, it would be more general and applicable
to take an infinite action space but not necessarily compact. Based on the results of
the set of distributions induced by the measurable selections of a correspondence,
we show the action spaces can set to be countable complete metric action spaces,
which extends the similar results shown before.
Then we discuss large games with transformed summary statistics. Non-cooperative
games with a continuum of small players and a compact action space in a finite
dimensional space have been used in the study of monopolistic competitions (see,
for example, Rauh [32] and Vives [42]). It is often assumed that the players’ payoffs
depend on their own actions and the summary statistics of the aggregate strategy
profiles in terms of the moments of the distributions of players’ actions. The exis-
tence of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium for such kind of games is shown in Rauh
[31] under some restrictions.
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In last section of Chapter 5, we reformulate the above model so that the players’
payoffs depend on their own actions and the mean of the strategy profiles under
a general transformation. The existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is then
shown. Our result covers the case when the payoffs depend on players’ own actions
and finitely many summary statistics as considered in Rauh [31]. It is more gen-
eral than that of Rauh [31] in several aspects. First, our action space is a general
compact metric space while the formulation in Rauh [31] requires the action space
to be a compact set in a finite dimensional space. Second, we work with a general
transformation rather than the special functions obtained by taking the composi-
tion of some univariate vector functions with projections. Third, we do not need
the unnatural assumption on the strict monotonicity of some component of the
univariate vector functions as in Rauh [31].
The existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is shown in Rath [29] for large
games with a compact action space in a finite dimensional space, where the payoffs
depend on players’ own actions and the mean of the aggregate strategy profiles.2
This result does not extend to infinite-dimensional spaces (see Khan, Rath and Sun
[17]) when the unit interval with Lebesgue measure is used to represent the space
of players; such an extension is possible if the space of players is an atomless hyper-
finite Loeb measure space (see Khan and Sun [19]). It is claimed in Rauh [31] that
“All these results involve the mean and hence do not apply to monopolistic compe-
tition models with summary statistics different from the mean or several summary
statistics”. However, our formulation shows that monopolistic competition models
can indeed be studied via the mean under some transformation.
2The case of a finite action space is discussed in Schmeidler [33].
Chapter 2
Mathematical Background
The main purpose of this chapter is to study some mathematical preliminaries
which will be used in the following parts. After giving some notations and defini-
tions, we study some properties of correspondence, fixed points, etc., and provide
some basic theorems needed in game theory, or, at least in this thesis.
2.1 Some Definitions
2.1.1 Notation
Rn denotes the n−fold Cartesian product of the set of real numbers R.
2A denotes the set of all nonempty subsets of the set A.
conA denotes the convex hull of the set A.
proj denotes projection.
∅ denotes the empty set.⊗
denotes product σ−algebra.
meas(X,Y ) denotes the space of (X ,Y)−measurable functions for any two mea-
surable spaces (X,X ) and (Y,Y).
7
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A∞ = A ∪ {∞} is a compactification of A.
If X is a linear topological space, its dual is the space X∗ of all continuous linear
functionals on X. If q ∈ X∗ and x ∈ X the value of q at x is denoted by q · x.
2.1.2 Definitions
The first term we want to emphasize is the concept of correspondence. Simply
speaking, a correspondence is a set-valued function. That is, it associates to each
point in one set a set of points in another set. The discussion to the correspondence
arises naturally here since this paper is dedicated to discuss game theory. For
instance, when we deal with non-cooperative games, the best-reply correspondence
is one of the most important tools.
Now, we start with a formal definition of correspondence, then followed by the
continuity of it.
Definition 1. Let X and Y be sets. A correspondence φ from X into Y assigns
to each x in X a subset φ(x) of Y . Let φ : X ³ Y 1 be a correspondence. The
graph of φ is denoted by Gφ = {(x, y) ∈ X × Y : y ∈ φ(x)}.
Just as functions have inverses, each correspondence φ : X ³ 2Y has two natural
inverses:
• the upper inverse φu defined by φu(A) = {x ∈ X : φ(x) ⊂ A};
• the lower inverse φl defined by φl(A) = {x ∈ X : φ(x)⋂A 6= ∅}.
Now, we can give the definition of different continuity of correspondences.
Definition 2. A correspondence φ : X ³ Y between topological spaces is:
1φ can also be viewed as a function from X into the power set 2Y of Y . For this reason, we
also denote a correspondence from X to Y as φ : X → 2Y .
Also, here we note that in this thesis we use notation “³” instead of notation “→” to differ
correspondences with common functions.
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• upper hemicontinuous(or, upper semicontinuous) at the point x if for every open
neighborhood U of φ(x), the upper inverse image φu(U) is a neighborhood of x ∈ X.
• lower hemicontinuous(or, lower semicontinuous) at the point x if for every open
set U satisfying φ(x)
⋂
U 6= ∅, the lower inverse image φl(U) is a neighborhood of
x.
• continuous if φ is both upper and lower hemicontinuous.
We now turn to the definition of measurable correspondences.
Definition 3. Let (S,Σ) be a measurable space and X a toplogical space (usually
metrizable). A correspondence φ : S ³ X is:
• weakly measurable if φl(G) ∈ Σ for each open subset G of X.
• measurable if φl(F ) ∈ Σ for each closed subset F of X.
Commonly, let (T, τ, µ) be a complete, finite measure space, and X be a separable
Banach space. We say the correspondence φ : X → 2Y has a measurable graph if
Gφ ∈ τ ⊗ β(X), where β(X) denotes the Borel σ−algebra on X.
Now, let G be a correspondence from a probability space (T, T , ν) to a Polish space
X. We say that G is a tight correspondence if for every ε > 0, there is a compact
set Kε in X such that the set {t ∈ T : G(t) ⊂ Kε} is measurable and its measure
is greater than 1− ε.
We say that the collection {Gλ : λ ∈ Λ} of correspondences is uniformly tight if for
every ε > 0, there is a compact set Kε in X such that the set {t ∈ T : for all λ ∈
Λ, Gλ(t) ⊂ Kε} is measurable and its measure is greater than 1− ε.
After giving these definitions of correspondences, we now introduce the definition
of selector (or, selection) of a correspondence. A selector from a relation R ⊂ X×Y
is a subset S of Y such that for every x ∈ X, there exists a unique yx ∈ S satisfying
(x, yx) ∈ R. We first give the formal definition of it.
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Definition 4. A selector from a correspondence φ : X ³ Y is a function f : X →
Y that satisfies f(x) ∈ φ(x) for each x ∈ X.
Another important item related to the game we discuss here is the concept of
fixed-point. When we deal with non-cooperative games, one way to prove the
existence of an equilibrium is to prove the existence of the fixed point of a best-
reply correspondence. We now give the definition of fixed point.
Definition 5. Let A be subset of a set X. The point x in A is called a fixed point
of a function f : A→ X if f(x) = x. Similarly, A fixed point of a correspondence
φ : A³ X is a point x in A satisfying x ∈ φ(x).
2.2 Known Facts
We have developed the definition of correspondence and some related items already.
Now we present some classical results which we will use later. Note that we do not
give specific proofs and just state these known facts. For the details about proofs,
one can refer any related book(see, for example, [1]). The reason we present them
here without proofs is to make the main theorems and proofs in this paper more
self-contained.
The first needed result is about the equivalence of compactness and sequential
compactness of a metric space.
Theorem 2.2.1. For a metric space the following are equivalent:
1.The space is compact.
2.The space is sequentially compact. That is, every sequence has a convergent
subsequence.
The next set of theorems are concerned with the properties of correspondence.
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Lemma 2.2.2. (Uhc Image of a Compact Set) The image of a compact set under
a compact-valued upper hemicontinuous correspondence is compact.
When we deal with upper hemicontinuity of a correspondence, we can often transfer
to prove it to be closed graph providing the following theorem.
Theorem 2.2.3. (Closed Graph Theorem) A closed-valued correspondence with
compact Hausdorff range space is closed if and only if it is upper hemicontinuous.
From the definition of upper hemicontinuity, we can have some other ways to assert
the upper hemicontinuity of a correspondence. The next theorem characterize
upper hemicontinuity of correspondences.
Theorem 2.2.4. (Upper Hemicontinuity) For φ : X ³ Y , the following state-
ments are equivalent.
1. φ is upper hemicontinuous.
2. φu(O) is open for each open subset O of Y .
3. φl(V ) is closed for each closed subset V of Y .
The next theorem states that the set of solutions to a well behaved constrained
maximization problem is upper hemicontinuous in its parameters and that the
value function is continuous.
Theorem 2.2.5. (Berge’s Maximum Theorem) Let φ : X ³ Y be a continuous
correspondence with nonempty compact values, and suppose f : X × Y → R is




and the correspondence µ(x) : X ³ Y of maximizers by
µ(x) = {y ∈ φ(x) : f(x, y) = m(x)}.
2.2 Known Facts 12
Then the value function m is continuous, and the “ argmax ” correspondence µ is
upper hemicontinuous with compact values.
Now, we come to the measurability of a correspondence. We have given the def-
inition of both measurability and weak measurability. In fact, for metric spaces,
weak measurability is weaker than measurability, but not so much weaker. The
next theorem shows that for compact-valued correspondences the two definitions
coincide.
Theorem 2.2.6. (Measurability VS Weak Measurability) For a correspondence
φ : (S,Σ)³ X from a measurable space into a metrizable space:
1. If φ is measurable, then φ is also weakly measurable.
2. If φ has compact values, then φ is measurable if and only if it is weakly mea-
surable.
Another theorem is used to assert a measurable correspondence as follows.
Theorem 2.2.7. Let (T, T ) be a measurable space, X a separable metrizable space,
U a metrizable space and φ : T × X ³ U . We suppose that φ is measurable in t
and continuous in x. Then φ is measurable.
Viewing relations as correspondences, we know that only nonempty-valued cor-
respondences can admit selectors, and nonempty-valued correspondences always
admit selectors. Recall the definition of selector. Similarly to that definition, a
measurable selector from a correspondence φ : S ³ X between measurable spaces
is a measurable function f : S ∈ X satisfying f(s) ∈ φ(s). We now state the main
selection theorem for measurable correspondences.
Theorem 2.2.8. (Kuratowski-Ryll-Nardzewski Selection Theorem) A weakly mea-
surable correspondence with nonempty closed values form a measurable space into
a Polish space admits a measurable selector.
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When we deal with the existence of equilibrium, one of those most basic way is
to use fixed-point theorem to assert that. As long as the game theory begins
to develop, the Brouwer fixed-point theorem is used by Von Neumann to prove
the basic theorem in the theory of zero-sum, two-person games. Nash also used
Kakutani fixed-point theorem to prove the existence of so called Nash equilibrium.2
In some infinite dimensional cases, we may refer to Fan-Glicksberg fixed-point
theorem to prove needed existence results.3 And when we deal with the existence
of equilibrium in this thesis, we also make quite lots of use of these fixed-point
theorems. So, we would like to end this chapter with the following set of different
versions of the fixed-point theorem.
Theorem 2.2.9. (Brouwer Fixed-point Theorem)Let f(x) be a continuous function
defined in the N−dimensional unit ball |x| ≤ 1. Let f(x) map the ball into itself:
|f(x)| ≤ 1 for |x| ≤ 1. Then some point in the ball is mapped into itself: f(x0) =
x0.
Theorem 2.2.10. (Kakutani Fixed-point Theorem)Let X be a closed, bounded,
convex set in the real N−dimensional space RN . Let the correspondence φ : X ³ X
be upper semicontinuous and have nonempty convex values. Then the set of fixed
points of φ is nonempty, that is, some points x∗ ∈ φ(x∗).
The following theorem is just a infinite dimensional version of Kakutani fixed-point
theorem.
Theorem 2.2.11. (Fan-Glicksberg Fixed-point Theorem) Let K be a nonempty
compact convex subset of a locally convex Hausdorff space, and let the correspon-
dence φ : K ³ K have closed graph and nonempty convex values. Then the set of
fixed points of φ is compact and nonempty.
2One can refer to Nash [25].
3See, for example, Khan and Sun [18].
Chapter 3
Basic Game Theory
We start by describing a finite game1 in Section 3.1. Section 3.2 is devoted to
reviewing the theory of Nash equilibrium and the basic existence result. Section
3.3 discusses briefly state the setting of atomless games, which will be discussed
with more details in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5.
3.1 Description of a Game
When we talk about a game, the essential elements of a game are players, actions,
payoffs, and information. These elements are often called the rules of the game. In
a game, each player is assumed to try maximize his payoffs, so he will take some
plans known as strategies that make actions depending on the information faced
1In game theory, a game can be expressed into two different ways: normal (or strategic) form
representation and extensive form representation. Although theoretically, these two representa-
tions are almost equivalent, the former one is more convenient for us to discuss static games, and
last one is more useful in dynamic games. To enable a self-contained and yet concise treatment,
we only present the game in normal form and discuss the properties of such expression in this
thesis since we restrict our discussion to static games.
14
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to him. The combination of strategies chosen by each player is known as the equi-
librium. And that will lead to a particular result, which is called the outcome of a
game. So, the basic concepts of game include player, action, information, strategy,
payoff, outcome and equilibrium. In the following, we first describe these elements
of a simple finite game(i.e., both the number of players and their actions set are
finite and there is no other restrictions such as private information, etc., which
will be discussed later). Note again that the analysis in this paper is restricted to
games in normal form.
1. Players are the individuals that make decisions. In game, the goal of each
player is to maximize his payoff by choosing his own action. We assume the num-
ber of the players is n and denote each player as i, (i = 1, · · · , n) and the set of
players as I.
2. An Action (or move) of player i, say, ai is a choice the player can make.
Then, player i’s action set Ai is the set of all actions available to him. And an
action combination is an n−vector a = (a1, · · · , an), of one action for each of the
players in the game.
3. Information is the players’ knowledge of the game. We will give more specific
definition of it in the following chapters. Here, we use Ti to denote the information
set of player i.
4. The strategy of player i, denoted by si, is a rule for player i to choose his
action. Player i′s strategy space Si = si1, · · · , siK is the set of strategies available
to him. And a vector s = (s1, · · · , sn) is called strategy profile. The set of these
strategy profiles in the game is thus the cartesian product S = ×iSi, which is called
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the strategy space of the game.
5. The Payoff of player i, denoted by U(s1, · · · , sn), is the expected utility he
gets as a function of the strategies chosen by himself and the other players.2
6. The outcome of the game is a set of elements that one picks from the val-
ues of actions, payoffs, and other variables after the game is played out.
7. An equilibrium s∗ = (s∗1, · · · , s∗n) is a strategy combination consisting of a
best strategy for each player in the game.
8 The best response of player i to strategies s−i3 chosen by the other players is
the strategy s∗i the maximize his payoff; that is,
Ui(s
∗
i , s−i) ≥ Ui(s′i, s−i),∀s′i 6= s∗i .
Till now, we have outlined most elements of a game. Normally, the analysis of
games involves different types of strategies:
(1) A pure strategy is for each player i, to choose his action si ∈ Si for sure given
the information he learns. More specifically, a pure strategy can be expressed as a
measurable function pi : Ti → Ai4. In this case, the payoff function Ui of player i
2In economics, the payoffs are usually firms’ profits or consumer’s utility.
3Here, it means “all the other players’ strategies”, which follows usual shorthand notation in
game theory. For any vector x = (x1, · · · , xn), we denote the vector (x1, · · · , xi−1, xi+1, · · · , xn)
by x−i.
4Strategy and action are two different concepts: strategy is the rule of action but not action
itself. But, in static games, strategy is just the same as action. Thus, The pure strategy space
is just A in our discussion. So, in the following discussions in this chapter, we do not distinguish
si with ai or Si with Ai
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is a function of s(a); and for any given s, the value of Ui is fixed.
(2) A behavior strategy5of player i is when player i observe some information, he
selects a action ai ∈ Ai randomly. More specifically, a behavior strategy strategy
for player i is a function βi : Ai × Ti → [0, 1] with two properties: (a) For every
B ∈ Ai, the function βi(B, ·) : Ti → [0, 1] is measurable; (b) For every ti ∈ Ti, the
function βi(·, ti) : Ai → [0, 1] is a probability measure.
(3) A mixed strategy6for player i is a probability distribution over his pure strategy
set Si of pure strategies given certain information. To differ from pure strategies,
we now denote mixed strategies for player i as sigmai rather than si. More specifi-
cally, a mixed strategy σi for player i is a measurable function σi : [0, 1]×Ti → Ai.
Thus, the mixed strategy of player i can be expressed as σi = (σi1, · · · , σiK),
where σik = σ(sik) is the probability for player i to choose strategy sik, ∀k =
1, · · · , K, 0 ≤ σik ≤ 1,
∑K
1 σik = 1. We use Σi to denote the mixed strategy space
for player i(that is, σi ∈ Σi, where σi is one of the mixed strategies of player i).
The vector σ = (σ1, · · · , σn) is called a mixed strategy profile and cartesian product
Σ = ×iΣi represents mixed strategy space(σ ∈ Σ). The support of a mixed strategy
σi is the set of pure strategies to which σi assigns positive probability. In finite





5Here, we only give a simple description of behavior strategy, since it is used more in dy-
namic games. In fact, although behavior strategy and mixed strategy are two different concepts,
Kuhn(1953) proves that in games of perfect recall, both are equivalent. More details about the
equivalence between mixed and behavior strategies under perfect recall is discussed in page 87-
90 of Fudenberg and Tirole [11]
6From these definitions, we can see that pure strategy can be understood as the special case of
mixed strategy. For instant, pure strategy s′i is equivalent to the mixed strategy σi(1, 0, · · · , 0),
which means, for player i, the probability of choosing s′i is 1, probabilities of choosing any other
pure strategies is 0.
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which is still denoted as Ui(σ) in a slight abuse of notation.
7
As we talk about a game, one of the most important concepts is the notion of Nash
equilibrium. And we will discuss such equilibrium in the next section with more
details.
3.2 Nash Equilibrium
In essence, Nash equilibrium requires that a strategy profile σ ∈ Σ8 should not only
be such that each component strategy σi be optimal under some behalf of player i
about the others’ strategies σ−i, but also should be optimal under the belief that
σ itself will be played.
In terms of best response, a (mixed) strategy profile σ ∈ Σ is a Nash equilibrium a
best response to itself. More specifically, σ∗ = (σ∗1, · · · , σ∗n) is a Nash equilibrium





−i) ≥ Ui(σi, σ∗−i),∀σi ∈ Σi.
The existence of Nash equilibrium was first established by Nash [25]. The pro-
gresses about the existence of equilibrium in different games after Nash’s work are
often still based on the techniques that Nash attempts. So we provide here both
the theorem and the proof of the existence of Nash equilibrium which are stated
in Nash [25]. The idea of the proof is to apply Kakutani’s fixed-point theorem to
the players’ “reaction correspondences” which are defined in proof.
Theorem 3.2.1. (Nash, 1950) There exists at least one Nash equilibrium(pure or
mixed) for any finite game.
7Note that the payoff Ui(σ) of player i is linear function of player i’s mixing probability σi.
8We keep the notation consistently with the last section. Note again that σ means a mixed
strategy profile.
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Proof: We use ri(σ) to represent the “reaction correspondences” of i, which maps
each strategy profile σ to the set of mixed strategies that maximize player i’s payoff
when others play σ−i. Define the correspondence r : Σ ³ Σ to be the Cartesian
product of the ri. If there exists a fixed point σ
∗ ∈ Σ such that σ∗ ∈ r(σ∗) and for
each i, σ∗i ∈ ri(σ∗), then this fixed point is a Nash equilibrium by the construction.
So, our task now is to show all the conditions of Kakutani fixed-point are satisfied.
First note that each Σi is a probability space, so it is a simplex of dimension (J−1),
where J is the number of pure strategies of player i. This means, Σi (so is Σ) is
compact, convex and nonempty.
Second, as we noted before, each player’s payoff is linear, and therefore continuous
in his own mixed strategy. So ri(σ) is non-empty since continuous functions on
compacts always can attain maxima.
Moreover the linearity of payoff function means: if σ′ ∈ r(σ) and σ′′ ∈ r(σ), then
λσ′ + (1 − λ)σ′′ ∈ r(σ), where λ ∈ (0, 1)(that just means, if both σ′i and σ′′i are
best responses to σ−i, then so is their weighted average). So, r(σ) is convex.
Finally, to show r(σ) is upper hemi-continuous we need to show that r(σ) has
closed graph, i.e., if (σm, σ˜m) → (σ, σ˜), σ˜m ∈ r(σm), then σ˜ ∈ r(σ). Assume there
is a sequence (σm, σ˜m) → (σ, σ˜), σ˜m ∈ r(σm), but σ˜ /∈ r(σ). Then, σ˜i /∈ ri(σ) for
some i. Thus, there is a ε > 0 and a σ′i such that Ui(σ
′
i, σ−i) > Ui(σ˜i, σ−i) + 3ε.
And since Ui is continuous, and (σ








i, σ˜−i)− ε > Ui(σ˜i, σ−i) + 2ε > Ui(σ˜mi , σm−i) + ε.
Hence, σ˜mi /∈ ri(σm), which contradicts the assumption we made. So, r(σ) is upper
hemi-continuous.
Since all the conditions of Kakutani fixed-point theorem are satisfied, the result
follows. ¤
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3.3 Atomless Games
On one hand, when we apply n−person game theory to economic analysis, it often
becomes a problem that small games (i.e., games with a small number players) are
hardly adequate to represent free-market situations. In this attempt, games with
such a large number of players that any single player have a negligible effect on the
payoffs to the other players are set to be atomless player space. For example, we
can use the number of points on a line (for example, the unit interval, [0, 1].) On the
other hand, when we deal with finite games with infinite (countable) actions and
private information, as we do in Chapter 4, the setting is also tied with atomless
measure as a model of diffuse information. We call the games which are set with
atomless property as atomless games. So far, we still need the following definitions.
Definition 6. A measurable set S is a null set for the measure µ if µ(S ′) = 0
for every measurable S ′ ⊂ S. An atom of the measure µ is a measurable non-null
set S such that, for every measurable S ′ ⊂ S we have either S ′ is a null set or
µ(S ′) = µ(S).
Definition 7. If the measure µ has no atom, it is called atomless.
In the following chapters, we will discuss atomless games with more details. In
Chapter 4, we discuss finite player games with countable action set and with in-
formational constraints, where we also make the assumption of diffuse information
with atomless measure. In Chapter 5, we deal with large games, where we assume
I be the set of players, I be a σ−algebra of subsets of I, and λ be an atomless
probability measure on I (Chapter 5).
Chapter 4
Games with Private Information and
Countable Actions
Games with private information (or imperfect information,incomplete information)
attracts a lot of attention in recent decades. It seems to be more practical to
give a appropriate situation that players make their decisions depending on the
observation of a certain information variable. As to such games, some interests
concern with the problem that whether there exists an equilibrium point or at
least an approximate equilibrium in pure strategies, if the game has an equilibrium
in mixed strategies. Radner and Rosenthal [27] and Milgrom and Weber [23] deal
with such problem together with the purification of a mixed strategy equilibrium
under the assumption of finite action spaces, with diffuseness and independence of
information, suitably formalized; The results with finite action sets also see those
in Aumann et al [6].
However, it would be more general and applicable to take a infinite action space.
Khan and Sun [18] extends the result into the case that action space can be chosen
as a countable compact metric space. In this paper, we show that the compactness
21
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can be removed in our case. In fact, the idea of setting the action space with-
out compact restriction is mentioned in the concluding remarks of Khan and Sun
[18]. As we show in the introduction, we realize that it may not be so obvious
to generalize the model and results in Khan and Sun [18] to the case of general
countable metric action spaces. In fact, we need to work with countable com-
plete metric action spaces (which clearly include the space of natural numbers) to
show the existence of pure strategy equilibrium. With such settings, we also show
the purification results. Without the completeness assumption or other related
assumptions, we do not know whether the result still holds.
The organization of this chapter is as follows. In Section 4.1, we provide our
mathematical results. More specifically, we work on the set of distributions induced
by the measurable selections of a correspondence with a countable range by using
the Bolloba´s and Varopoulos extension of the marriage lemma. In section 4.2, we
discuss a typical kind of games with a finite number of players, a countable action
set, and private information constraints . And we prove the purification results
of behavior strategy equilibria and the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium in
such games.
4.1 Distribution of an Atomless Correspondence
This section introduces some results that lead to a fairly general treatment to the
games that we discuss later.
A denotes a countable complete metric space; (T, T , λ) denotes an atomless prob-
ability space. Let {ai : i ∈ N} be a list of all the elements of A. Let F be a
correspondence from T to A, where F is measurable if for each a ∈ A, F−1(a) =
{t ∈ T : a ∈ F (t)} is measurable. For any F , let
DF = {λf−1 : f is a measurable selection of F}.
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We now state first a special case of the continuous version of the marriage lemma
offered by Bolloba´s and Varopoulos [9].
We present it with our own notation. Let (Tα)α∈I be a family of sets in T , and
Λ = (τα)α∈I be a family of non-negative numbers, I a countable index set. We call
(Tα)α∈I is Λ−representable1, if there is a family (Sα)α∈I of sets in T such that for
all α, β ∈ I, α 6= β, Sα ⊆ Tα, λ(Sα) = τα, Sα ∩ Sβ = Ø.
Theorem 4.1.1. (Tα)α∈I is Λ−representable if and only if
λ(∪α∈IFTα) ≥ Σα∈IF τα
for all finite subsets IF of I.
We first state our main selection theorem for countable vectors.
Theorem 4.1.2. Let (T, T , λ) be a atomless probability space; and fα ∈Meas(T,R+), α ∈
I, where I is a countable index set, such that for all t ∈ T , Σα∈Ifα(t) = 1.
Then, there exist measurable functions f ∗α ∈ Meas(T, {0, 1}), α ∈ I, such that





f ∗α(t)dλ(t) for all α ∈ I.
Proof: First, we take (Tα)α∈I in Theorem 4.1.1 by choosing Tα = T for all α ∈ I.
Then we take τα =
∫
T
fα(t)dλ(t) for all α ∈ I. I is countable. Let Λ = (τα)α∈I .
Clearly, we have
λ(∪α∈IFTα) = λ(T ) = 1,
which is always bigger or equal to Σα∈IF τα for all finite subsets IF of I.
Then, we can apply Theorem 4.1.1 to assert that (Tα)α∈I is Λ−representable. That
is, there is a set of sets (Sα)α∈I in T such that for all α, β ∈ I, α 6= β, Sα ⊆ T ,
λ(Sα) = τα, Sα ∩ Sβ = Ø.
1As to certain examples that are Λ−representable, one can refer to the constructions used in
the proofs of Theorem 4.1.2 and 4.1.4
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That is, ∫
T
fα(t)dλ(t) = λ(Sα) =
∫
T
f ∗α(t)dλ(t) for all α ∈ I,
where f ∗α(t) is characteristic function of Sα. ¤
We now present another theorem which can be viewed as a corollary of the above
theorem to cover some purification results for atomless games that we used later.
Theorem 4.1.3. Let (T, T , λ) be a atomless probability space; A a countable metric
space represented as {a1, a2, ...}; I a countable index set; and g ∈Meas(T,M(A)).
Let g(t;B) represent the value of the probability measure g(t) at B ⊆ A and g(t; da)
the integration with respect to it. Then there exists g∗ ∈Meas(T,A) such that,
(1) for all B ⊆ A, ∫
T
g(t;B)dλ(t) = λg∗−1(B);
(2) g∗(t) ∈ {ai ∈ A : g(t; {ai} > 0} ≡ supp g(t) for λ−almost all t ∈ T .
Proof : By applying Theorem 4.1.2 to gi(t) = g(t, {ai}), we can assert the existence
of functions g∗‘i (t), such that∫
T





i (t)dλ(t) for all ı ∈ I, (4.1)
where (Si)i∈I is a family of countable partitions of T, that is, (Si)i∈I , Sα ∩Sβ = Ø,
for all α, β ∈ I, α 6= β; and g∗′i (t) is the characteristic function of Si.
Now we define g∗(t, ai) = aig∗
′
(t, ai). Then,we assert this g
∗ ∈ Meas(T,A) is just
what we need. Note that g∗
′
(t, ai) = 1{ai}(g
∗(t, ai)).











And according to the definition of g∗, we can get
g∗−1(t; ai) = aig∗
′−1(t; ai) = λ(Si).
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g∗−1(t; ai) = λg∗−1(B);
(2)From the equation (4.1.1) and the definition of g∗, we can assert the conclusion
directly. ¤
The next result is about the convexity of the distribution of an atomless corre-
spondence.
Theorem 4.1.4. For any F , DF is convex in the space M(A).
Proof : One can pick up ι1, ι2 from DF and α ∈ [0, 1]. According to the definition
of DF , there are measurable selections f1 and f2 of F satisfying λf−11 = ι1 and
λf−12 = ι2. Define τi = τ({ai}) = αλf−11 (ai) + (1 − α)λf−12 (ai), where ai ∈ A for
any i ∈ I. I is countable. Let Λ = (τα)α∈I .





1 (ai) ∪ f−12 (ai). Then for any finite subset IF of I,⋃
i∈IF
















Applying Theorem 4.1.1, we know that (Tα)α∈I is Λ−representable. That is, we
can get a family (Si)i∈I of subsets of T such that for i, j ∈ I with i 6= j, Si ⊂ Ti,
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λ(Si) = τi, and Si ∩ Sj = ∅.2
Now we define f(t) =
∑
i∈I ai1Si(t). Clearly, it is also a selection of F . Therefore
αι1 + (1− α)ι2 ∈ DF , and we reach the conclusion. ¤
The following lemma is a modification of Lemma 1 in [18]. Instead of the com-
pactness condition on the countable action space, we only require a non-emptiness
condition.
Lemma 4.1.5. Let {fn}∞n=1 be a sequence of measurable functions from T to a
countable metric space A such that τn = λf
−1
n converges weakly to a probability
measure τ on A as n → ∞. Let F (t) ≡ cl-Lim{fn(t)}, the set of all limit points
of the sequence {fn(t)}∞n=1. If F (t) is nonempty for all t, then, there exists a
measurable selection f of F such that λf−1 = τ for each t ∈ T .
Although we drop the compactness condition on the action space A, the proof of
this lemma is the same as that of Lemma 1 in Khan and Sun [18], provided that
F (t) 6= ∅,∀t. Thus we skip it. Note that the proof in Khan and Sun [18] also uses
Lemma 2.1.
Theorem 4.1.6. If F is compact valued, then DF is compact in M(A).
Proof : Let A∞ be a compactification of A. Note thatM(A∞) is a compact metric
space. So for any sequence {µn}∞n=1 from DF ⊂ M(A∞), there is a convergent
subsequence. Without loss of generality, we assume {µn}∞n=1 converges weakly to
a probability measure µ on A∞. From the definition of DF , one can pick up a
sequence {fn}∞n=1 of measurable selections of F such that λf−1n = µn for each
n ≥ 1.
2In fact, here we can another proof using a little trick similar to the proof of Theorem 4.1.2.
The idea is as follows: First observe 1 = λ(T ) =
∑
i∈I τi. Then one can follow the steps
attempted in theorem 4.1.2, and get λ(Si) = τi, where (Si)i∈I is a family of subsets of T satisfying
α, β ∈ I, α 6= β, Sα ⊆ T , λ(Sα) = τα, Sα ∩ Sβ = Ø.
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According to Proposition 3.8 in Sun [38], {µn : n = 1, 2, . . . } is tight. That is , for
any ε > 0, there exists a compact set Kε ⊂ A, such that µn(Kε) ≥ 1− ε for all n.
Since Kε is also compact in A∞, the weak convergence of {µn} to µ implies that
µ(A) ≥ µ(Kε) ≥ 1−ε. Let ε tends to zero yielding µ(A) ≥ 1. So µ is concentrated
on A, i.e., µ ∈ M(A). Now that all the µn and µ0 are concentrated on A, the
weak convergence of µn to µ0 in M(A∞) is equivalent to the weak convergence in
M(A).3
Define G to be G(t) = cl-Lim{fn(t) :}, which is nonvoid and included in F (t),
because all the sequence fn(t) is from the compact set F (t) for each t. The pre-
ceding lemma yields that there exists a measurable selection f from G such that
µ = λf−1, in other words, µ ∈ DG ⊂ DF . Therefore DF is compact. ¤
Now we turn to investigate the upper semicontinuity of the distribution of a cor-
respondence depending on a parameter.
Theorem 4.1.7. Assume that for each fixed y in Y , a metric space, G(·, y) (which
is also denoted by Gy) is a measurable correspondence from T to A, and for each
fixed t ∈ T , G(t, ·) is upper semicontinuous on Y . Also, assume that there exists a
compact valued correspondence H from T to A such that G(t, y) ⊂ H(t) for all t
and y. Then DGy is upper semicontinuous on Y .
Proof : By Theorem 2.2.44, in order to show DGy is upper semicontinuous on Y , it
suffices to show that D−1G (V ) ≡ {y : DGy ∩ V 6= ∅} is closed in Y for each closed
subset V ofM(A). Towards this end, suppose {yn}n≥1 is a sequence from D−1G (V )
which converges to y0 ∈ Y . By the definition, for each n ≥ 1, there exist a measures
3In fact, for each open subset O∞ of A∞, lim supn µn(O∞) ≥ µ0(O∞). So lim supn µn(O∞ ∩
A) ≥ µ0(O∞ ∩ A), i.e., for each open subset O ⊂ A, lim supn µn(O) ≥ µ0(O). Hence we get the
weak convergence of µn to µ0 in M(A).
4Also, see Lemma 14.4 in Aliprantis and Border [1]
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µn ∈ V and a measurable selection gn of G(·, yn), such that µn = λg−1n . Note that
M(A∞) is compact and µn ∈ M(A∞). So there is a subsequence of {µn}, say
itself without loss of generality, converging weakly to some µ0 ∈ M(A∞). Since a
compact valued correspondence H includes G(·, y) for all y, as in the proof of the
preceding theorem, we have µ0 ∈ M(A) and µn converges weakly to µ0 in M(A).
Therefore µ0 ∈ V since V is closed inM(A). Also Lemma 4.1.5 implies that there
exists a measurable selection g of the correspondence F ≡ cl-Lim{gm : m ≥ 1} ⊂ H
such that λg−1 = µ0. From the upper semicontinuity of G(t, ·) for t ∈ T , we obtain
cl-LimG(t, yn) ⊆ G(t, y0) for all t ∈ T . So for each t ∈ T , F (t) ⊆ G(t, y0). Thus
g(·) is a measurable selection of G(·, y0). Therefore µ0 ∈ DGy0 . So DGy0 ∩V 6= ∅ for
it contains µ0. This means that y0 ∈ D−1G (V ). Therefore D−1G (V ) is indeed closed
and we obtain the expected results. ¤
4.2 Games with Private Information
Consider a game Γ consisting of a finite set I of l players. Suppose for each i,





i∈I(Zi×Xi)) , the product space with the product σ-algebra and




he random mappings ζi(ω) and χi(ω) are interpreted respectively as player i’s
private information related to his action and payoff.
Each player i in I first observes the realization, say zi ∈ Zi, of the random element
ζi(ω), then chooses his own action from a nonempty compact subset Di(zi) of a
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countable complete metric space Ai.
5 The payoff of player i is given by utility
function ui : A ×Xi → R, where A =
∏
j∈I Aj is the set of all combination of all
players’ moves. We also assume the following uniform integrability condition (UI):
(UI) For every i ∈ I, there is a real-valued integrable function hi on (Ω,F , µ)
such that for µ-almost all ω ∈ Ω, |ui(a, χi(ω))| ≤ hi(ω) holds for a ∈ A.
We can thus describe a finite game with private information as
Γ = (I, ((Zi,Zi), (Xi,Xi), (Ai, Di), ui)i∈I , µ).
For any player i, let meas(Zi, Di) be the set of measurable mappings f from (Zi,Zi)
to Ai such that f(zi) ∈ Di(zi) for each zi ∈ Zi. An element gi of meas(Zi, Di) is
called a pure strategy for player i. A pure strategy profile g is an l-vector function
(g1, ..., gl) that specifies a pure strategy for each player. For a pure strategy profile




ui (g1(ζ1(ω)), ..., gl(ζl(ω)), χi(ω))µ(dω).
An (Nash) equilibrium in pure strategies is defined as a pure strategy profile g∗ =
(g∗1, ..., g
∗
l ) such that for each player i,
6
Ui(g
∗) ≥ Ui(gi, g∗−i) for all gi ∈ meas(Zi, Di).
Let M(A) be the space of probability measures on Ai endowed with the weak
topology. Note that such topology is metrizable by the Prohorov metric since the
space Ai is metrizable. A behavioral strategy for the player i, say gi
7 is an element
5A mapping F from a set C to the set of nonepmty subsets of a set E is called a correspondence
from C to E. Thus, Di is a correspondence from Zi to Ai that takes compact subsets of Ai as
its values; such a correspondence is called a compact-valued correspondence.
6Note that g∗−i is an (l − 1)-vector function given by g∗ with its ith component deleted, and
(gi, g∗−i) is the l-vector obtained from g
∗ with its ith component replaced by gi.
7Note that there is no inconsistency with our notation of pure strategy above, since every pure
strategy can also be though of as a behavioral strategy with point measures.
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of meas(Zi,M(Ai)), whereM(A) is equipped with its Borel σ−algebra. Given the










ui(a1, · · · , al, χi(ω))g1(ζ1(ω); da1),
· · · , gl(ζl(ω); dal)µ(dω),
where again g is an l−vector function given by (gi, ..., gl). An equilibrium (Nash) in
behavioral strategies is defined similarly to that in pure strategies. More formally,




i=1 meas(Zi,M(Ai)) is an equilibrium in behavioral
strategies if for each player i, Ui(g
∗) ≥ Ui(gi, g∗−i) for all gi ∈ meas(Zi, Ai).
We say an equilibrium b∗ in pure strategies is a purification of an equilibrium b
in behavioral strategies if, for every player i, Ui(b) = Ui(b
∗), and for all zi ∈ Zi,
b∗i (zi) ∈ supp bi(zi).
That means, a purification b∗ of an equilibrium b is an equilibrium that gives every
player the same expected payoff that b does. In the following, we first prove two
results that under certain hypotheses about the random variables ζ1, χ1, · · · , ζl, χl,
every equilibrium has a purification. And we prove the existence of equilibrium of
pure strategies under certain conditions.
We now provide our first two results concerning with the purification of mixed
strategies.
Theorem 4.2.1. If, for every player i,
(a) the distribution of ζi is atomless,
(b) the random variables {ζj : j 6= i} together with the random variable ξi ≡ (ζj, χj)
form a mutually independent set,
then every equilibrium has a purification.
Proof: Let g = (g1, · · · , gl) ∈
∏l
i=1meas(Zi, (Ai)) be an equilibrium in behavioral
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strategies. Fix any player i = 1, · · · , l. Apply Theorem 4.1.3 to the collection
{(Zi,Zi), µζ−1i , Ai, gi},
where µζ−1i is defined as the measure induced on the measurable space (Zi,Zi)8to
obtain a pure strategy g∗i ∈ meas(Zi, Ai) such that for each i,









(2) g∗i (zi) ∈ {ai ∈ Ai : g(zi; {ai} > 0} ≡ supp g(zi) for µζ−1i −almost all zi ∈ Zi.
Let g∗ = (g∗1, · · · , g∗l ). We should show now that g∗ is a purification of g.
To see this, we now focus on player i and let ζ−i be the random variable (ζ1, · · · , ζi−1, ζi+1, · · · , ζl),
and (ξi, ζ−i) be the random variable form Ω to the space (Zi ×Xi,
∏
j 6=i Zj), with
µ(ξi, ζ−i)−1 the corresponding measure induced on that space. Hypothesis (b) in






Then, since ui is a µ−integrable function on Ω for any a ∈ A, we can assert the



















E{ui(a, χi) : ζi = zi}gi(zi : ai)dµζ−1i (z)× Πi6=j
∫








Σai∈Ai [Σa−1∈A−1E{ui(a, χi) : χi = zi} × Πi6=jτj({aj})]gi(zi; {ai})dµζ−1i (zi).
8Hypothesis (a) ensures that the measure µζ−1i is atomless. So we can apply our theorem
4.1.3.
9See, for example, Ash [2], pp. 213-214.
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The first equality uses the fact that expectations taken over a countable space can
be written as summations instead of integrals; the second equality relies on ui be-
ing a uniformly summable function; the third invokes the ”change of variable” for-
mula;10 and the independence hypothesis; the fourth is true just by definition; and
the fifth appeals to the conditional expectation still being a uniformly summable
function.
This computation brings out the fact that the payoff to the ith player depends
on the distribution of the other players’ strategies, namely on τj, j 6= i. Since we
purified the other players’ mixed strategies in the way that this distribution does
not change, all we need to check is that g∗i gives the same payoff to the i
th player
as does gi. Towards this end, let
F
′
(zj) = argmaxai∈AiGi(zi, ai), where
Gi(zi, ai) = [Σa−1∈A−1E{ui(a, χi) : ζi = zi}Πi6=jτj({ai})]
We now claim that
supp gi(zi; ·) ⊂ F ′(zj) for µζ−1i a.e. zi ∈ Zi
If not, there must exist measurable function fi, hi from Zi to Ai such that
gi(zi)({fi(zi)}) > 0 and {zi : Gi(zi, fi(zi)) < Gi(zi, hi(zi))} is not µζ−1i −null.
Define a new mixed-strategy g′i satisfied, g
′
i(zi) equal gi(zi), if Gi(zi, fi(zi)) ≥
Gi(zi, hi(zi)), otherwise let it be equal to gi(zi)−gi(zi)({fi(zi)})δfi(zi)+gi(zi)({fi(zi)})δhi(zi).
But that means that Ui(g) < Ui(g
′
i, g−i). That is a contradiction to the maximality
of g.
Now, we clearly have that Ui(g
∗
i , g−i) ≥ Ui(g). And from the beginning of the
induction, we know that for j 6= i, g∗j and gj induce the same distribution τj on A.
So we have Ui(g
∗) = Ui(g∗i , g−i) = Ui(g), which completes the proof. ¤
10See, for example, Billingsley [7], pp.222-223.
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Theorem 4.2.2. If, for every player i,
(a′) the distribution of ζ ′i is atomless,
(a′′) the set Z ′′i is finite,
(b) the random variables {ζ ′j : j 6= i} together with the random variable ξi ≡
(ζ ′i, ζ
′′
i , χj) form a mutually independent set,
then every equilibrium has a purification.
Sketch of the proof: Given Theorem 4.2.1, we can follow the idea in Khan and Sun
[18].11 The little trick is to replace in Theorem 4.2.1, for each player i, his action
space Ai with the new space A˜i ≡
∏
z′′i ∈Z′′i Ai. For each i, Ai is a countable metric
space and Z ′′i is finite, so A˜i is clearly a countable metric space. For any player
i, his behavioral strategy gi ∈ meas((Z ′i, Z ′′i );M(Ai)). Now, define the behavioral










i ), {a˜i(z′′i )}),∀z′i ∈ Z ′i,∀a˜i ∈ A˜i,
where a˜i(z
′′
i ) is the z
′′
i−th coordinate of a˜i.
Thus the following is clear. Given a behavioral strategy g = (g1, . . . , dl) in the
game, we define another strategy g˜ as above for another game with Z ′ = Z ′1×· · ·×Z ′l
as the space of relevant private information, and with A˜i the action space for player
i. Hypotheses (a′) and (b) guarantee that hypotheses (a) and (b) of Theorem
4.2.1 are satisfied. Thus, Theorem 4.2.1 yields a pure strategy g˜∗ = (g˜∗1, · · · , g˜∗l )
with g˜∗i ∈ meas(Z ′o; A˜i) in this new game. Then, a pure strategy equilibrium
g∗ = (g∗1, · · · , g∗l ) with g∗ ∈meas((Z ′i, Z ′′i );M(Ai)) in original game can be ob-
tained. ¤
In our statement of Theorems 4.2.1 and 4.2.2, we have made an effort to keep
the similar structure with the corresponding theorems in Khan and Sun [18] and
11Or, one can refer to earlier paper like Radner and Rosenthal [27].
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those in Radner and Rosenthal. Note again that Radner and Rosenthal focus
on finite actions, and Khan and Sun base their theorem on countable compact
metric action set. Our cases only need action set to be countable metric space
with compact-valued correspondence. Therefore, although the statement of theo-
rem and the techniques that dealt with in proof are similar as works before, both
model and its applications are new and more general. The next theorem is to
assert the existence of an equilibrium in pure strategies.
Theorem 4.2.3. Under the hypotheses of Theorem 4.2.2, and under the condition
that for every player i ∈ I, ui(·, χi(ω)) is a bounded continuous function on A for
µ−almost all ω ∈ Ω, there exists an equilibrium in pure strategies.
Proof: We use the Kakutani-Fan-Glicksberg fixed point theorem to prove the ex-
istence of Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. We shall present the proof for the
special case that Zi = Z
′
i for all i, i.e., there is no atom component for private
information variable ζi. One can check, by following the sketch of proof of Theo-
rem 2 in Khan and Sun [18], to get the same conclusion under the hypotheses of
Theorem 4.2.3.
Let us consider a single player i. Since ui(a, χi(·)) is uniformly µ-integrable function
on Ω, we can assert12 that there exists a function Vi : A × Zi → R, such that
Vi(a, ζi(ω)) is the regular conditional expectation of ui(a, χi(ω)) under the sub-σ-








Moreover, by Theorem 2.2 in Dynkin and Evstigneev [?], we know that for µζ−1i -
almost all zi ∈ Zi, V (·, zi) is continuous and bounded on A. Without loss of
generality, we can assume for all zi ∈ Zi, V (·, zi) is continuous and bounded on
12For example, one can refer to Theorem 2.1 in Dynkin an Evstigneev [?].
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A.13
Denote DDi = {(µζ−1i )g−1i : gi is a measurable selection of Di}. Construct a
mapping from Zi × Ai ×
∏l
j=1DDj into R defined by




In fact, Gi is simply the payoff to player i when information zi is revealed to him
and he takes the action ai, while all other players, generically indexed by j 6= i,
play the mixed action λj, j 6= i.14 It is obvious that, for any fixed zi ∈ Zi, Gi is a
continuous real valued function on Ai×
∏l
i=1DDi ; and for any fixed (ai, λ1, · · · , λl),
it is measurable on Zi. ThereforeGi is jointly measurable, in particular, measurable
on Zi ×
∏l
i=1DDi for each fixed ai ∈ Ai.
Then, consider the set-valued mapping, from Zi ×
∏l
i=1DDi into Ai given by
(zi, λ1, · · · , λl)³ F i(zi, λ1, · · · , λl) = argmaxai∈Di(zi)Gi(zi, ai, λ1, · · · , λl).
The joint continuity of Gi on A and the compactness of each Di(zi) imply that
F i(zi, λ1, · · · , λl) is compact, measurable with respect to zi, and upper semicontinu-
ous with respect to (λ1, ·, λl) ∈
∏l
i=1DDi . The latter is guaranteed by Berge’s max-
imum theorem. Furthermore, for each l-tuple (λ1, · · · , λl) ∈
∏l
i=1DDi , there exists
a measurable selection from the correspondence F i by Kuratowski-Ryll-Nardzewski
Selection Theorem.15
We now consider the object DF i
(λ1,··· ,λl)
= {(µζ−1i )g−1i : gi is a measurable selection
of F i(·, λ1, · · · , λl)}. By the assertion of the existence of a measurable selection,
it is nonempty. Then, applying Theorem 4.1.4, Theorem 4.1.6 and Theorem 4.1.7,
13In fact, V (·, zi) ≤ h˜(zi), with h˜(ζi) = E[h|ζi]. Recall that for µ-almost all ω ∈ Ω,
|ui(a, χi(ω))| ≤ hi(ω) holds for a ∈ A.
14Note that under the assumption on action choice (i.e., compact-valued property of Dj for
any j ∈ I) of our models, λj ∈ DDj .
15See, for example, Aliprantis and Border [1].
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we know that it is convex, compact and upper semicontinuous with respect to
(λ1, · · · , λl) ∈
∏l





such that for any tuple (λ1, · · · , λl) ∈
∏l
i=1DDi ,






Thus Φ is nonempty, compact, convex valued, and upper semicontinuous with
respect to (λ1, · · · , λl). And from Theorem 4.1.4 and Theorem 4.1.6, one can get
DDi is nonempty, compact and convex. Applying the Kakutani-Fan-Glicksgerg
fixed-point theorem, we know that there exists a fixed-point
(λ∗1, · · · , λ∗l ) ∈ Φ(λ∗1, · · · , λ∗l ),
and for each player i, λ∗i ∈ DF i
(λ∗1,··· ,λ∗l )
. So there exists g∗i ∈ meas(Zi, Ai) such that
g∗i is a selection of F
i




i . It is clear that g
∗ = (g∗1, · · · , g∗l ) is
an equilibrium in pure strategy. ¤
Chapter 5
Large Games
In this chapter, we show the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium for non-
cooperative games with a continuum of small players. Such games are often so
called as large games. The organization of this chapter is as follows:
Section 5.1 describes a typical large game model. Section 5.2 relies on the math-
ematical results developed in Chapter 4 and asserts the existence of equilibrium
for a game with continuum of players that are divided into finite types, and with
countable actions. Section 5.3 deals with a non-cooperative game with a continuum
of small players and a compact action space.
5.1 A Simple Large Game
In 1973, Schmeidler [33] showed that a large game with an atomless space of players
and finite actions has a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies and if the payoffs are
restricted so as to depend only on the average response of others then there is a
pure strategy equilibrium. A simpler proof of the result is showed in Rath [29].
Also Rath [29] shows that when the analysis is restricted to pure strategies, it not
only allows for a much simpler proof, but also extends to the case where the space
37
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of actions is a compact subset of n-dimensional Euclidean space.
We now restate the settings and the result in Rath [29].
Let I = [0, 1] endowed with Lebesgue measure λ be the set of players, P the space
of actions where P is a compact subset of Rn. A strategy profile is a measurable
function from I to P . Let FP denote the space of all strategy profiles and for any
f ∈ FP let s(f) =
∫
I
fdλ, and SP = {s(f)|f ∈ FP}.
Now, let UP denote the set of real-valued continuous functions defined on P × SP
endowed with sup norm topology.
Then, we say, a game is a measurable function g : I → UP . And a Nash equilibrium
of a game g is a f ∈ FP such that for almost all t, g(t)(f(t), s(f)) ≥ g(t)(x, s(f)),
∀x ∈ P .
Theorem 5.1.1. Every game described above has a Nash equilibrium.
The argument of the proof also makes use of Kakutani’s fixed point theorem as
what is done in classical proof in Nash [26]. For details, one can refer to Rath [29].
5.2 Large Games with Finite Types and Count-
able Actions
This section is a generalization of Theorem 10 in Khan and Sun [18]. We consider
the game here as a game with a continuum of players and with a countable action
set, where the players are divided into finite different types. With the mathematical
results developed in the last chapter, we can assert the existence of equilibrium in
pure strategies of such games.
First, we give the game model as follows.
Let I be the set of players, (I, I, λ) an atomless probability space representing the
space of player names, and A a countable metric space which represents the action
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space. Each player i, i ∈ I choose his own actions D : I ³ A in A, where the
correspondence D is compact-valued. The players are divided into l types. So let
I1, · · ·, Il be a partition of I according to the player’s type, where the partition with
positive λ-measures c1, · · ·cl. For each 1 ≤ j ≤ l, we denote λj to be the probability
measure on Ij such that for any measurable set B ⊆ Ij, λj(B) = λ(B)/cj. Let
UA be the space of real-valued continuous functions on A×M(A)l, endowed with
its sup-norm topology and with B(UA) its Borel σ-algebra. A strategy profile is
a measurable function f : I → A satisfying f(i) ∈ D(i), i ∈ I, which specifies a
strategy for each player.
Definition 8. A game Γ is a function from I to UA. And an equilibrium (Nash)
of a game Γ is a f : I → A with f(i) ∈ D(i) for each i ∈ I, such that for λ-almost
all i ∈ I,
ui(f(j), λ1f
−1
1 , . . . , λlf
−1
l ) ≥ ui(a, λ1f−11 , . . . , λlf−1l )
for all a ∈ D(i), where ui = Γ(i) and fj is the restriction of f to Ij.
We now apply our results on the distribution of atomless correspondence to prove
the existence of Nash equilibrium in such a game. Before the main theorem, we de-
fineDj as the restriction ofD to Ij, andDDj = {λjg−1j , gj is a measurable selection of Dj},
for j = 1, · · · , l.
Theorem 5.2.1. Every game described above has a Nash equilibrium.
Proof: Consider the set-valued mapping, from I ×∏lj=1DDj into A given by
(i, µ1, · · · , µl)→ F (i, µ1, · · · , µl) = arg max
a∈D(i)
ui(a, µ1, · · · , µl),
where (µ1, · · · , µl) ∈
∏l
j=1DDj . It is obvious that for given (µ1, · · · , µl), F (·, µ1, · · · , µl)
is a compact-valued correspondence from I to A. Berge’s maximum theorem and
the joint continuity of ui on A×
∏l
j=1DDj imply that for each i ∈ I, F (i, µ1, · · · , µl)
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is upper semicontinuity of on
∏l
j=1DDj . Moreover, for each l-tuple (µ1, · · · , µl) ∈
M(A)l, ui is measurable in I×A,1 since u(·, ·, µ1, · · · , µl) is a measurable function
on I, and a continuous function on A. Therefore, there exists a measurable selec-
tion from the correspondence F(µ1,··· ,µl)
2 by Kuratowski-Ryll-Nardzewski Selection
theorem.
For each 1 ≤ j ≤ l, let F j be the restriction of correspondence F on Ij×
∏l
j=1DDj .
Now we consider the object DF j
(µ1,··· ,µl)
. By the assertion of the existence of a
measurable selection, it is nonempty. Then, applying Theorem ??, Theorem 4.1.6
and Theorem 4.1.7, we know that it is convex, compact and upper semicontinuous
with respect to (µ1, · · · , µl) ∈
∏l
j=1DDj . As we do in the proof of Theorem 2.1,




j=1DDj such that for any tuple
(µ1, · · · , µl) ∈
∏l
j=1DDj ,






The correspondence G is compact and convex valued, upper semicontinuous with
respect to (µ1, · · · , µl) ∈
∏l
j=1DDj . So, Kakutani-Fan-Glicksgerg fixed-point the-
orem implies the existence of a fixed-point (µ∗1, · · · , µ∗l ) ∈ G(µ∗1, · · · , µ∗l ), and for
each j, a measurable selection f ∗j of F
j(·, µ∗1, · · · , µ∗l ) such that λjf ∗−1j = µ∗j . Fi-
nally, let f ∗ be the mapping from T to A such that for each i ∈ Ij, f ∗(i) = f ∗j (i).
It is clear that f ∗ is an equilibrium. ¤
1We can still apply Theorem 3.14 in Castaing and Valadier [12] to assert this declaration.
2As before, F(µ1,··· ,µl) is a shorthand notation of F (·, µ1, · · · , µl).
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5.3 Large Games with Transformed Summary Statis-
tics
Non-cooperative games with a continuum of small players and a compact action
space in a finite dimensional space have been used in the study of monopolistic
competitions (see, for example, Rauh [32] and Vives [42]). It is often assumed that
the players’ payoffs depend on their own actions and the summary statistics of the
aggregate strategy profiles in terms of the moments of the distributions of players’
actions. Rauh [31] takes into consideration of such games with some restrictions
and shows the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium for such kind of games.
However, as we showed in the introduction, some restrictions are not natural. We
show here the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium for such games but with
less constraints than others. We reformulate the above model so that the players’
payoffs depend on their own actions and the mean of the strategy profiles under a
general transformation.
And we discuss in Section 5.1, the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium
is shown in Rath [29] for large games with a compact action space in a finite
dimensional space, where the payoffs depend on players’ own actions and the mean
of the aggregate strategy profiles. We note that this result does not extend to
infinite-dimensional spaces (see Khan, Rath and Sun [17]) when the unit interval
with Lebesgue measure is used to represent the space of players; such an extension
is possible if the space of players is an atomless hyperfinite Loeb measure space (see
Khan and Sun [19]). It is claimed in Rauh [31] that “All these results involve the
mean and hence do not apply to monopolistic competition models with summary
statistics different from the mean or several summary statistics”. However, our
formulation shows that monopolistic competition models can indeed be studied
via the mean under some transformation.
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In the following, we first provide the main theorem and two kinds of proofs of it.
Then we state some specific examples and give remarks.
5.3.1 The Model and Result
Let I be the set of players, I be a σ−algebra of subsets of I, and λ be an atomless
probability measure on I. We use (I, I, λ) to represent the space of player names.
For example, one can take (I, I, λ) as the unit interval [0, 1] with Lebesgue measure.
Let P denote a nonempty, compact and metric space such that each player i ∈ I
chooses a pure strategy from P . For instance, P might be the set of possible
prices an individual firm can set for its product. A strategy profile is a measurable
function f : I → P , which specifies a strategy for each player.
Let s be a continuous function from P to the n-dimensional Euclidean space Rn,
and C the range of s.3 The continuity of s and compactness of P imply that C
is also compact. Let Σ4 be a convex and compact subset of Rn, which contains
C. It is clear that for any strategy profile f , σf =
∫
I
(s ◦ f)dλ ∈ Σ. The mean σf
of s ◦ f is a summary statistics of the society which the players can observe. A
payoff function for a player is a real-valued continuous function defined on P ×Σ,
which means that it depends on her own action p ∈ P and the vector σ ∈ Σ of
summary statistics. Let P denote the space of all continuous payoff functions with
the supremum norm.
Now, we define a game to be a measurable function Γ : I → P , which assigns
each player i ∈ I a continuous payoff function Γ(i)(·, ·). An equilibrium (in pure
3A special case can be considered as: Let s : R→ Rn by s(x) = (x, x2, ..., xn) then the first n
moments of the price profile f : I → P are given by ∫
I
(s ◦ f)dλ. In the discussion in Vives[42]




s(q(i))di where q(i) is firm is output and s : R → R is a strictly increasing continuous
function.
4For example, we can set Σ = convC.
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strategies) for such a game is a strategy profile f : I → P such that each player
plays a best response against the induced vector of summary statistics; i.e.,
Γ(i)(f(i), σf ) ≥ Γ(i)(p, σf )




In the following theorem, we present a general result on the existence of equilibrium
for the game Γ.
Theorem 5.3.1. Let (I, I, λ) be an atomless probability space, P a nonempty,
compact metric space, s a continuous function from P onto a compact subset C of
Rn, and Σ a compact, convex subset of Rn containing C. Let P denote the space of
real-valued continuous functions on P × Σ with the supremum norm. Then every
game Γ : I → P has an equilibrium in pure strategies.
Proof: First, define the best-response correspondence B : I × Σ→ P as
B(i, σ) = argmaxp∈PΓ(i)(p, σ),
which is the set of maximum points for the continuous function Γ(i)(·, σ) on P .
By standard arguments (see, for example, Rath [29]), we can obtain that for each
σ ∈ Σ, B(·, σ) is a closed-valued, measurable correspondence from I to P ; and for
each i ∈ I, B(i, ·) is an upper semicontinuous correspondence from Σ to P .
Let F : I × Σ → Σ be the correspondence defined by F (i, σ) = s(B(i, σ)), and
Φ : Σ→ Σ, a correspondence defined by Φ(σ) = ∫
I
F (i, σ)dλ. We shall show that
Φ is (a) nonempty-valued, (b) convex-valued, (c) upper semicontinuous.
(a)Let σ ∈ Σ. By the standard measurable selection theorem (see, for example,
Theorem 8.1.3 in Aubin and Frankowska [3], there exists a measurable function
f : I → P such that f(i) ∈ B(i, σ) for all i ∈ T . Then the measurable function
g : I → Σ defined by g = s ◦ f satisfies g(i) ∈ F (i, σ) for all i ∈ I. Thus, (a) is
proved.
5.3 Large Games with Transformed Summary Statistics 44
(b) Since λ is atomless, Φ is convex-valued by Theorem 8.6.3 in Aubin and Frankowska
[3], which is a simple consequence of the classical Lyapunov theorem.
(c)Since B is upper semicontinuous and s is continuous, Theorem 14.22 in Alipran-
tis and Border [1] implies that F is upper semicontinuous on Σ for each i ∈ I. A
classical result of Aumann on the preservation of upper semicontinuity via integra-
tion (see, Aumann [4, 5]) says that Φ is also upper semicontinous.
By the Kakutani fixed-point theorem, there exists a σ∗ ∈ Φ(σ∗). That is, there
exists a measurable function g : I → Σ such that σ∗ = ∫
I
gdλ and g(i) ∈ F (i, σ∗).
Note that F (i, σ∗) = s(B(i, σ∗)), which is a subset of C. Thus, the measurable
function g takes values in C.
Since s is a function from P onto C, we can define a correspondence s−1 from C to
P such that s−1(c) = {p ∈ P : s(p) = c}. Since s is continuous, it is obvious that
s−1 is a weakly measurable correspondence with nonempty closed values from the
measurable space C with Borel σ-algebra to the compact metric space P . Hence,
the Kuratowski-Ryll-Nardzewski Selection Theorem in Aliprantis and Border [1],
implies that we can find a Borel measurable selector h of s−1. Then it is clear
that the strategy profile f : I → P defined by f = h ◦ g is an equilibrium in pure
strategies for the game Γ. ¤
5.3.2 Remarks and Examples
(1) A continuum of firms, represented by [0, 1], is considered in Vives [42]: the price
pi of firm i’s product is given by pi = Pi(qi, q˜), where qi is firm i’s output, and q˜ is
a vector of summary statistics which characterizes the output distribution of firms
(e.g., q˜ =
∫
s(qi)di, here, when s is the identity function then q˜ is the average
quantity). The profits of firm i, i ∈ [0, 1], is given by pii = (P (qi, q˜) − m)qi − F ,
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where F is a fixed cost and m is a constant marginal cost of production. By
taking first-order condition, a Nash equilibrium can be obtained, characterized by
(pi −m)/pi = ²i, where ²i = −(qi/pi)(∂Pi/∂qi) is the quantity elasticity of inverse
demand. The existence of Nash equilibrium can be deduced in Rauh’s model by
viewing [0, 1] as the set of players, the quantities that firms can maintain as their
actions—elements in set P , and q˜ as a vector of summary statistics in Σ by taking
s : R → R to satisfy one consumption-strict monotonicity. Clearly, it can also
be obtained naturally by ours by taking similar constructions but without other
constraints.
(2)The function s in Rauh [31] is defined by taking the composition of the uni-
variate vector functions s1, . . . , sm with projections proj1, . . . , projm. Let C be the
range of s. It is obviously contained in the set Σ, which is the product of the
intervals between the minimum and maximum of the functions srq as in Rauh [31].
In our paper, we define s as any continuous function,5 and target space Σ as any
convex and compact subset of Rn, which contains C, and also contains that Σ
defined in Rauh [31]. Thus both the model and the main theorem in Rauh [31] are
special cases of ours.
(3) The action set P is often set to be a subset of Euclidean space. So a nat-
ural question arises whether the action set can be a generic compact metric space.
Our theorem gives an affirmative answer. Note that the action space in our model
can be infinite dimensional. For example, we can take P = M(A), the space of
probability measures on A endowed with the weak topology, where A is an infinite
subset of an Euclidean space. We also consider another more specific example. Let
the firms’ payoffs depend on their own quantities (which are belonging to R) along
5The type of assumption on the strict monotonicity of the functions sr1 as in Rauh [31] is not
needed in our case.
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the time and the summary statistics of the society. We formulate it as follows. We
assume time set to be [0, T ]. A continuum of firms [0, 1] take actions from action
set P , where P is taken to be a bounded closed subset of L∞([0, T ],R) with topol-
ogy σ(L∞([0, T ],R), L1([0, T ],R)). Note that P is compact by Alaoglu Theorem.
Let D be an upper bound for P . Let s : P → Rn be a projection at n epoches:
for f ∈ P , s(f) = (f(τ1), . . . , f(τn)), where (τ1, . . . , τn) are n fixed sampling times.
The set of summary statistics Σ can be taken as [0, D]n. The payoff function for
a firm is a real-valued continuous function defined on P × Σ. Then, following our
main model and theorem, we can claim the existence of Nash equilibrium in this
example.
(4) The target space can only be finite-dimensional in general.6 We now show
that our model can adopt the target space to be any separable Banach space by
choosing an atomless hyperfinite Loeb measure space (I, I, λ) as the space of play-
ers.7 We will reserve all other notations discussed above except that Σ can be a
weakly compact and convex subset of a separable Banach space(X, ‖ ·‖) with weak
topology instead of a subset of Rn. Moreover, we see s as a weakly continuous func-
tion from P onto a weakly compact subset C of a separable Banach space(X, ‖ ·‖).
Our main theorem is still valid in this setting when the integral in the definition
of σf is the Bochner integral. To prove this result, we can simply use Theorems 1
and 6 in Sun [39] to claim the convexity and upper semicontinuity as in (b) and
(c) above; we can then use the Fan-Glicksberg fixed point theorem instead of the
Kakutani fixed-point theorem to prove the existence of Nash equilibrium.
6For instance, we just assume that I is the closed unit interval with Lebesgue measure, then
an equilibrium may not exist as shown in Khan, Rath and Sun [17] and Rath, Sun and Yamashige
[30].
7See the theory of correspondences on Loeb spaces developed in Sun [39].
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Abstract
In this thesis we first discuss games with private information. Based on our
mathematical results on the set of distributions induced by the measurable se-
lections of a correspondence with a countable range, we provide the purification
results and also prove the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium for a finite game
when the action space is countable but not necessarily compact.
Another aspect of this thesis focuses on large games. We show the existence of
equilibrium for a game with continuum of players that are divided into finite types,
and with countable actions. Also, the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium
is shown for a non-cooperative game with a continuum of small players and a
compact action space. The players’ payoffs depend on their own actions and the
mean of the transformed strategy profiles. This covers the case when the payoffs
depend on players own actions and finitely many summary statistics.
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